Elements of a non-authoritarian international strategy
Conflicts over order and sovereignty between authoritarian regimes and democracies are increasing (⇒ Messner). These conflicts are currently being reflected in differing views on Ukraine or Georgia’s
geopolitical orientation or in the question of whether support should be given to rebellions against authoritarian rule (e.g. in Libya or Syria).
Across the world democratic rule is going on the defensive. What makes matters worse is the fact that some authoritarian regimes are relatively successful, ensuring continuing economic growth, for instance.
The signs of intensifying confrontation between authoritarian regimes and democracies are largely identical to the findings of democratisation research, which suggest that across the world democratic rule is going on the defensive. What makes matters worse is the fact that some authoritarian regimes are relatively successful, ensuring continuing economic growth, for instance. Authoritarian rule thus becomes a competitive option in the global competition for sovereignty.
How can foreign policy tackle these challenges? In the Ukraine crisis, the leading Western democracies have suspended Russia from the G8. However, this return to the G7 reflects a certain degree of helplessness. Dealings with authoritarian states like Russia should therefore be flanked by two foreign-policy measures: firstly, the development of relations with democratic global players such as the IBSA states (India, Brazil, South Africa) and, secondly, the modernisation of the United Nations (⇒ Sidiropoulos).
A network of democratic global players
We know that a shared preference for a particular form of domestic rule does not necessarily mean shared interests in international regulatory issues (⇒ Stein/Tempel).
For example, the reaction of Germany’s partners in the GIBSA quadrilogue (Germany, India, Brazil, South Africa) in the Ukraine crisis has been one of restraint. We should not attach too much importance to this behaviour. Rather, it should spur us on to sound out where the common interests and preferences lie with regard to shaping the international order (⇒ Adebajo/Virk).
After all, the democratic global players do have a considerable amount in common, such as the fact that non‑violent protests are recognised as a legitimate channel for political conflict, or the rejection of systematic violence against people of a different persuasion, or the conviction that such behaviour by repressive states should be stopped – through an international response, if necessary.
The Brazilian "Responsibility while Protecting" initiative may be a good point to start from in this connection. In response the international community’s engagement in Libya, this initiative proposes further developing the principle of international responsibility to protect (R2P). One does not always have to be in agreement with the analyses or conclusions of this initiative – or those of other initiatives by the democratic global players – but the related claim to rights of co‑participation or co‑leadership is one that should certainly be taken up by policymakers in a constructive way.
A network of democratic global players ("G‑Dem") could develop elements of an attractive model for democratic governance in the 21st century. Such an approach, "IBSA+", might include for example the democracies represented in the G20.
Modernising the United Nations
However, the so‑called club governance exercised by the informal G formats like the G20 meets with substantial reservations from those who are not members of these clubs. That is why an anti‑authoritarian policy oriented predominantly to club governance will meet with ongoing resistance and a "limited tendency to cooperate" on the part of non‑members. A network of democratic global players would likewise be greeted with reservations. These reservations could be countered by a joint commitment to modernising the UN.
Notwithstanding all its pathologies and dysfunctions, the UN remains the only universal forum which allows all states to influence international politics (⇒ Annan).
It will be all the more important in future for the democratic global players to commit to modernising the UN. By "modernising" we mean reforming the working methods of the Security Council and the General Assembly, but also ensuring better funding and staffing. This would be a worthwhile goal for a network of democratic global players who would thereby highlight the advantages of a democratic, participatory style of governance for international politics.
