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“Public diplomacy … deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.” (Definition of public diplomacy by Tufts University)

German foreign policy in Europe? Non-state European policy stakeholders feel somewhat confused when they see these two terms put together. In fact, as recently as 2004, a Director-General from the Federal Foreign Office deleted the sentence “European policy is domestic policy” from a European Movement Germany paper.

Now the Treaty of Lisbon has added new fault lines to European tectonics. The debate on the candidate for President of the European Commission both before and after the European Parliament elections, as well as the current appointments to the EU’s top jobs, keep Germany in its role as a key player. At the same time, decision-making in Germany has never been as intrinsically intertwined with Europe as it is now. Parliamentarians, lobbyists and German media are no longer merely participants in Europe’s multilevel democracy – they have their sights set on winning. German diplomacy needs to recognise this and learn how to deal with it.

In traditional diplomacy, only the ambassador and his team represented Germany in third countries. He – or increasingly she – represents German statehood in the host country and serves as an interlocutor on Germany’s policies for a wide range of stakeholders from the political sphere, business and society, as well as for German players abroad. But especially within the EU, the claim to sole representation has long since been curtailed.

Consequently, literature on “public affairs management” (or “lobbyism”, as it is commonly called) clearly differentiates between member countries and member states. Lobbyists from the profit and non-profit sectors now also represent their interests internationally and without state support. They use their connections subtly, but effectively. However, there is one problem: German stakeholders do not all enjoy the same starting conditions. German foreign policy needs to help and act as an intermediary.  

At first glance, the Federal Foreign Office has a great tradition of working via intermediary organisations and “[in] close consultation with NGOs, whether on humanitarian assistance or the protection of human rights, with the people involved in Cultural Relations Policy, think tanks, trade associations, companies and churches” (Bagger, Thomas (2013): Netzwerkpolitik. In einer veränderten Welt wachsen dem Auswärtigen Dienst neue Rollen zu. IP – Internationale Politik (1), pp. 44 – 50).

But how do things look in the EU member states? The sovereign debt crisis has already become a litmus test as regards acceptance of Europe, but also of Germany – and the litmus strips have turned bright red. The general assembly of the European Movement Germany also noted that there are many cases of poor communication between the EU members states’ social, business and political stakeholders.

Greece has become a particular test case. Funding for political foundations in the EU member states had been cut back for years, but the offices in Greece were set up quickly as a sort of “crisis PR”. All of a sudden, there was a great need for communication, and the idea of decentralisation resurfaced.

The Goethe-Institut and the political foundations are a valuable asset in Germany's “European domestic policy”. The Chambers of Commerce Abroad are also important. However, the political foundations have a negative reputation for allegedly working on behalf of their party. This reputation is undeserved, but it still limits the foundations’ ability to act. Unfortunately, the other parties find it hard to quote from very positive reports on the political and social situation in the country.

Germany’s strength lies in its diversified economy with a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as in a pluralistic and partly corporatist society. Unlike France, diversity in German society is excellently, sustainably and democratically organised. This is clearly a German strength, but do embassies or brochures proudly draw attention to it, for example by having a brand like “Land of Diversity” to complement the business-focused campaign “Land of Ideas”? 

Foreign economic and cultural relations policy enjoys financial and institutional support, but so far German diplomacy has hesitated to embrace social groups outside the spheres of business, culture and (party) politics.

For example, is any diplomat aware that six million young people are involved in organisations affiliated with the German Federal Youth Council? And do they know if there is a local affiliated association? It is important to know the answers to such questions, for example if you want to set up a bilateral youth office. Unlike employees in the specialised ministries, embassy staff do not have a background in organised civil society in Germany, either as regards their training or personal lives. 

This is a major reason why “public diplomacy” has remained a term borrowed from English. Even here in the review process, it was an American who first brought it up.

(→ Clüver). And the Federal Foreign Office website only has a few scraps of information on this topic. Moreover, the think tanks and academics tasked with advising the Federal Foreign Office find it hard to deal with German associations’ reputation of allegedly seeing their own organisations as the centre of the universe.

Because of their own polity, many consultants are not particularly open to decentralised communication and a pluralistic, democratic system of associations. However, the balancing of interests in associations and across borders is extremely important for European democracy (Auer, Claudia; Srugies, Alice (2013): Public Diplomacy in Germany).

Meanwhile, German foreign policymakers and the institutions that advise them have even more trouble with the term “digital diplomacy”. This is also traditional. In early 2011, during the heyday of the Arab Spring, the then head of the Federal Foreign Office’s Policy Planning Staff said that the ministry relied fully on the experts from the White House as regards Twitter and other social media. In the meantime, a revolution has taken place. Ministers of state, ambassadors and even deputy directors-general now use Twitter. It’s not too late for all this – but they lag years behind other people in terms of experience. There is also the question of compatibility with traditional diplomatic training. However, this is a conflict in the political culture and not in technology.

The general assembly of the European Movement Germany called on the Federal Government to develop “European public diplomacy”, obviously in close coordination with the Chambers of Commerce Abroad, the Goethe-Institut and the political foundations. The aim is to foster cross-border dialogue between the political sphere, society and business. In fact, this debate was launched by the Federal Foreign Office itself in 2013.

With 238 member organisations from all spheres of society and business, the European Movement Germany has a comprehensive overview of the activities its members conduct in Europe. The organisation will showcase this diversity on its new website and help those involved in German public diplomacy to make use of it. We hope that the next step will be to develop a method of open communication and consultation in the spirit of Article 11 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which Germany also ratified.

Ultimately, it is policymakers who have to make the decisions on European policies, but before doing so, they can and they should make greater use of the international expertise of European Movement Germany member organisations. European integration can only be achieved in cooperation with the wide range of social forces. Traditional diplomacy based on statism is not enough.