An active policy serves Berlin's interests
What, if anything, should be done to get German foreign policy right? The short answer is "more of the same". However, when confronting new challenges – the deficiencies of the European security system, military activities in the Arctic, and, if need be, lifting sanctions as part of a nuclear deal with Iran – established practices may not be good enough.
Europe can ill afford to conduct its affairs in the framework of today's underdeveloped system. Germany is well placed, both by geographical position and political tradition, to assume a leadership role in this respect.
The conflict over Crimea and Ukraine has exposed two basic flaws in the European security system.
First, the Russian annexation of Crimea was a violation of international law: of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Budapest agreement of 1994. Foremost among the critics were powers that usually – i.e. more often than not – violate international law when using force. International law has become an argument of convenience, even in Europe.
An effort should therefore be made to update and reinvigorate the norms, rules and standards of European security affairs, one point of departure being the "10 commandments" of the Helsinki Final Act. To limit claims to special spheres of interest, no single nation or group of nations should have exclusive rights in the management of peace and stability in Europe.
Second, the institutional architecture is deficient. The Ukrainian crisis was full-blown before important actors started to talk to each other. Institutions committing Russia and Western powers to address brewing conflicts at an early stage are missing.
Unfortunately, the OSCE does not have that role today; neither does the NATO-Russia Council. Europe needs institutions where the parties can meet as equals and discuss security issues as a common public good.
In the "period of opportunity" after the end of the Cold War, it was customary to call for Russian integration into European security and cooperation. After the conflict in Georgia in 2008, President Medvedev tabled proposals to this effect, for further discussion. Some European countries took an interest, others not, and it led nowhere.
Today, measures are taken to punish Russia, and calls are made for enhanced military preparations to constrain it. Under the circumstances, this is the name of the game, but in the long run, a more constructive approach is suggested by the common security philosophy: security is something we have to build together with our adversaries; it is not something we can build through unilateral action.
When the protestations against the Russian annexation of Crimea have run their course and, hopefully, the crisis in Ukraine has been alleviated, the European security system should therefore be revisited and lessons drawn. Europe can ill afford to conduct its affairs in the framework of today's underdeveloped system. Germany is well placed, both by geographical position and political tradition, to assume a leadership role in this respect.
Overview for this article
1
Four conflicts demand more leadership from Germany
2
Joint energy efforts in the High North
3
Rules for the Arctic Ocean
