Germany must trust its allies and partners, and then expect to be trusted in turn. Trust means accepting vulnerabilities.
In the first decades of this approach the unavoidable question was whether Germany would revert back from the new liberalism to the old nationalism. It remains the case that whenever German power is being exerted opponents invariably invoke the symbols of the Third Reich. This is, however, no longer a real issue.
The hard questions now are about the viability of the new model. Because of its past, Germany hedged less than others. It eschewed a "breakout" capability, in the sense of maintaining a capacity for independent action.
Its military operations beyond Europe have been tentative, occasional and always under a multilateral banner. Unlike Britain and France, it has no nuclear capability of its own. Its commitment to the European Union has been such that it was even prepared to give up its prized Mark to help forge a currency union.
All this means that Germany must trust its allies and partners, and then expect to be trusted in turn. Trust means accepting vulnerabilities. Germany thus depends on the United States to provide a guarantee against nuclear threats, Russia for much of its energy supplies, and its fellow EU members to keep the Union working in such a way that does not put an unreasonable burden on German resources. Although it relies on stability in its main export markets it is unable to intervene unilaterally, or even contribute much by way of military capability to the interventions of others when important regions become unstable.
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