Domestic factors appear to limit the scope for significant changes in German foreign policy.
Will these vulnerabilities be as tolerable in the future as they have been in the past? If not, what can be done to mitigate their effects?
In four respects domestic factors appear to limit the scope for significant changes in foreign policy. First, German public opinion is hostile to more energetic overseas engagements, especially if this involves the military. Second, a refusal to contemplate any more nuclear reactors has left Germany even more dependent on imports of gas and oil, including from Russia. Third, exporters are a formidable lobby against taking steps which might close off key markets, for example as a result of sanctions. Fourth, its trade surplus, a combination of strong exports and weak domestic consumption, aggravates the balance of payments problems for its partners.
Together these factors have created an external perception that domestic politics is a drag on a more ambitious foreign policy, requiring caution from a government reluctant to be seen to be getting too far ahead of public opinion, and inhibits its ability to lead Europe even though it is now the EU’s main source of leadership.
These drags have been evident whenever Germany has been asked to do more outside of Europe, which has led to a recent debate inside the country about whether it should be less inhibited, for example by offering more support to the French interventions in Africa or by helping dispose of Syrian chemical weapons.
Certainly, along with its European partners, Germany could face significant disruptions originating in regions such as the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. Any sustained conflict, even if more cold than hot, between Japan and China would be economically catastrophic.
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