Germany, along with its EU partners, can and should do more outside of Europe. But the impact will be limited.
Symbolically, a greater German engagement with the generality of international issues would be welcome. Germany, along with its EU partners, can and should do more outside of Europe.
But the impact will be limited. In Asia Europeans can make occasional helpful noises about the need for dialogue and support the mediating efforts of others. More can be done in the Middle East, notably as participants in diplomatic contacts with Iran, but there are few obvious ways of addressing the unfolding tragedy of Syria other than by trying to contain its effects. This may change, but at the moment the key focus must be on Europe for it is here that Germany is most expected to lead and where its foreign policy model faces the greatest pressure.
The setting for this focus is a European political structure undergoing severe change. It is still responding to the coming together of East and West Germany in 1990, along with the implosion of European communism, and the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. As one great power shrank dramatically another grew. In these circumstances the possibility that Germany might throw its weight around in the centre of Europe was addressed by deepening the EU, notably through the adoption of the Euro.
Little effort was made to preserve the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. In probably one of its most fateful interventions, Germany led the move to recognise Croatia and Slovenia as they seceded from Yugoslavia in late 1991, and then accepted the steady advance of both NATO and the EU towards the new Russian Federation. Many of the problems now being faced are a consequence of the ambition of that period.
The most important of these up to now has surrounded the viability of the Eurozone as an extended currency union. The Eurozone crisis began as it became apparent as Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus were unable to cope with their debts. To enable them to stay in the Euro there had to be a series of rescue packages, often requiring austerity measures, which kept these countries afloat. These required substantial German contributions. In July 2012 this crises eased following Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" comments, as yet without the ECB actually having to do very much.
The crisis, however, is not over. The international economy is not strong, there is potential for a number of exogenous shocks, and the weaker economies have barely recovered. Should pressure revive again, which could happen with little notice, then the "whatever it takes" pledge could be tested quickly. Any measures will potentially be controversial in Germany. It would, of course, be unwise for Berlin to talk openly about contingency planning for the next great Eurozone crisis, as the fact of its concern might even trigger the crisis. Nonetheless it has to be hoped that such planning is underway.
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